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Summary
Presented in this paper is a methodology to 
evaluate, analyze, and predict critical human 
performance. The methodology is a novel 
approach towards evaluating potential human 
error. The aim of the Critical Human Perform­ 
ance and Evaluation Program. (CHPAE) is to 
develop a methodology to control and minimize 
the natural sulbjectivity associated with evaluation 
programs. The typical approach, of the CHPAE 
is; (1) analyze the system or task, (2) select 
evaluation factors, (3) establish and prevalidate 
a rating manual or check list, (4) perform an 
analysis and evaluation;, (5) estimate potential 
error probabilities, and (6) perform critical 
comparison studies. Much work still remains to 
be done towards a complete and final validation 
of the program--partly because there is a variety 
of methods both computerized and manual that 
can, be applied to quantify the evaluations and 
partly because of the need of large population 
statistics, other than, experimental or selected 
source data to validate the error potential 
p r e d i c ti on of th e plan» Regardless of th e early 
limitations of the metric, the plan will perform 
a valuable human factors evaluation of a group of 
tasks, subsystems or systems.
Introduction
The evaluation, and prediction, of potential 
human error is one of the most perplexing and 
evasive problems facing the modern state-of-the- 
art. By relative comparison with the technologi­ 
cal progress of hardware failure prediction 
technology, the investigation and solving of 
problems involving equipment failures or 
unscheduled holds, where the breakdown of the 
human interface has been the causative factor, 
is today's most fertile area toward improving 
total systems effectiveness and systems relia­ 
bility.
Systems reliability cannot be assessed by 
considering hardware and hardware alone. All 
facets of integrated hardware, man/machine, 
and/or extra-environmental factors must be 
considered. Also, rational consideration is 
required to take into account not only the poten­ 
tial probabilities of the beast's inhumanities to 
man, but also man's inhumanities to the sensi­ 
tive beast.
History of Past Research
Very little is known about potential human 
error prediction; even less is known about the 
reliability metric describing the man/machine 
interface.
Without sparing sophistication to either 
extreme, both qualitative and quantitative 
attempts at human factors prediction and analysis 
of probable human error have been proposed. 
Regardless of these attempts, human errors are 
continually being reported.
The following reports are typical of human 
error dilemma. Shapero and Bates (I960) 
published a report revealing the impact of 
human induced failures involved in military 
weapons systems. 1 This report states that:
a. Thirty-nine percent of 3, 829 mal­ 
functions related to weapons systems were 
classified as human initiated.
b 0 Twenty percent of 419 unscheduled 
holds were classified as human initiated.
c. The analysis of two systems using the 
Ballistic Missile Division Failure and 
Code List revealed 322 human initiated 
malfunctions in one system and 193 in the 
othe r .
A report by W. I. LeVan (I960) discloses the 
following facts. (1) of nine Air Force pro­ 
grams reviewed, 20 and 53 percent of the field 
errors were caused by human failure, (2) of 
Army Satellite Programs, up to 60 percent of 
the failures were attributed to human error, and 
(3) of weapon, missile, and guidance systems, 
12 to 45 percent of the failures were attributed 
to human error.
There is a well-defined requirement for a 
human factors potential error prediction, evalua­ 
tion, or analysis program, especially one which 
is relatively easy to apply, versatile and
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unrestricted in its application, practical, and 
not overly complex in its formulation.
Critical Human Performance, Analysis, and 
Evaluation Rationale (CHPAE)
The CHPAE methodology employs system, 
task, and factor analysis in conjunction with 
correlated actual and/or experimental failure 
data to evaluate and establish a rated criticality 
rank of human performance. The criticality is 
based on the probability of successful human 
performance.
The CHPAE metric is a statistical analysis 
of the representative rated distributions and/or 
expression of computerized matrix techniques 
applied to the rated factor comparisons.
As sumptions
The assumptions of the CHPAE method­ 
ology are:
a. Ideal potential human input interacting 
with ideal machine and /or environmental 
conditions facilitate the least probability 
of human error and the highest reliability.
b. Conversely, the worst possible human 
potential input with the worst possible 
machine and/or environmental conditions 
propagate the greatest probability of 
human error and the least reliability for 
success.
Methodology Goals and Philosophy
The goal of the CHPAE program is to 
present a methodology for evaluating critical 
human performance.
The philosophy is to design a methodology
which:
a. Provides a technical approach that 
systematically establishes a criticality 
rank of human performance.
b. Is both qualitative and quantitative, 
versatile in its application, and relatively 
easy to apply by both human factors person­ 
nel and reliability engineers.
c. Incorporates a methodology having the 
inherent capability to use manual or 
computer methods for the processing of 
data.
d. Preparing necessary mathematical 
models and procedures to predict the 
degradation the human element introduces 
to the system or subsystem.
Objectives
The objectives of the applied CHPAE 
methodology are to:
a. Establish a criticality rank related to 
human performance.
b. Predict personnel effectivity or proba­ 
bility of human induced failure related to 
operation, checkout, and/or maintenance 
of a system.
c. Identify and eliminate sources of poten­ 
tial critical human induced failures.
d. Estimate required check redundancy 
for most probable success.
e. Evaluate designs from a human factors 
or man-compatibility point of view.
f. Evaluate predesign concepts.
g. Provide inputs to training programs 
identifying and stressing areas of critical 
human performance.
h. Establish goals for optimum human 
reliability.
Typical Technical Approach
The methodology is basically applied as a 
program in, three phases. The technique is 
versatile and. is applicable to a system, sub­ 
system, event, activity,,, or 'task. The evaluation 
or rating manuals can be tailor-made to a 
particular1 system,* or developed as a generalized 
rating manual. 'The generalized approach would 
apply to a family of systems, subsystems, or 
even generalized to yield "ballpark" estimates 
of random activity.
Phase I of the methodology comprises:
a. Analyzing the system,
b. Establishing the rating manual,
c. Yerifying the rating or evaluatUm
manual,
Phase II is the evaluation effort and
includes:
a. The actual rating, analysis,
evaluation*
b. Establishing the performance criticality.
c. Performing the overall systems criti- 
cality study analysis*
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Phase III is the documentation, mainten­ 
ance, and follow-up phase. It also includes final 
test and validation of the project, and final 
validation of the rating manual.
Pre-Validating the Rating Manual
The CHPAE is a pre-validated critical 
factor approach to the evaluation and prediction 
of critical human performance. Pre-validation 
is accomplished by first developing a preliminary 
rating manual, selecting a representative sample, 
rating the sample, applying the preliminary 
manual, and then comparing the results to 
experimental data source or actual failure data. 
Figure 1 outlines the validating procedure.
Developing the Evaluation Manual
Development of the evaluation manual is 
preceded by project exploratory systems or task 
analysis. The purpose of the exploratory study 
analysis is to select representative critical 
factors which best represent the man/machine 
and/or man/environment interfaces. Candidate 
critical performance factors are first proposed 
in the preliminary evaluation manual. Typical 
candidate critical performance factors are 
shown in Table 1. The critical factors elected 
to be employed in the final evaluation manual are 
the factors which provide the optimum evaluation 
of the system or project and have the highest 
correlation with prediction of potential human
Critical Factor Definition
The factors selected are verbally defined 
and a rating assigned to the factors. The rating 
scale is by the degree of error confidence or 
probable error related to the degree of difficulty. 
Following definition, of the factors and degrees, 
task and/or activities of experimental or actual 
data of known probabilities are slotted in their 
proper or estimated level, in, the defined rating 
scale. The slotted known or experimental 
probabilities in the rating scales are referred to 
as ''''inference marks". Figure 2 shows a typical 
definition of factor degree and inference marks 
used in the CHPAE approach*
The slotting of inference data of known or
validated task probabilities is a continuous up­ 
dating effort. As the feedback procedure cranks 
more and more actual data back into the rating 
manual, the evaluation predictions become more 
confident and consistent.
Value Weighting and Point Assignment
Values apportioned to the factors are based 
on the criteria of optimum 'prediction for critical- 
ity ranking. The preliminary values are slotted, 
known, or estimated task probabilities.
After validation of the preliminary manual, 
the final proportionate value weightings assigned 
to the factors are dependent on their correlation 
and contribution or ability to predict a valid 
critical rank. This can be accomplished by 
multiple or partial correlation coefficients in 
conjunction with trial re-runs of the sample 
validation procedure, until the rating manual is 
calibrated to provide a valid critical rank.
Evaluation Procedure
The initial point of departure as to where 
to begin the evaluation is of no major importance. 
All activities of events will be summarized from 
the subtasks up through the subsystem and 
finally summarized and compared for the total 
system.
The evaluations can be performed for a 
task, a group of sub-tasks, or for an activity „ 
In any event, a complete task analysis and study 
of all technical, environmental, tools, equip­ 
ment or other affecting facets of the man/ 
machine interface is required prior to the 
evaluation.
Pertinent information from the study and 
analysis is recorded on a typical rating specifi­ 
cation form (See Figures 3 and 3A). The criti­ 
cal factors are rated by applying the evaluation 
manual and assigning related degrees and points. 
Rating consideration is given to all facets of the 
activity, and substantiating data is recorded to 
support the rating.
CHPAE Metric
The CHPAE model is an abstract matrix 
representation of the performed activity and the 
affecting man/machine or man/ma chine/environ­ 
ment factors. The abstract model is represented 
as a total two way classification matrix or a split 
matrix as shown in Table II. Table II delineates 
a typical activity matrix with 12 selected 
factors and the 10 tasks which comprise the 
activity.
Variance Analysis
The variance model is computerized as a 
12 x 100 combined matrix with a subroutined 
split matrix 5 x 100 for the man affecting fa9tors 
and 7 x 100 split matrix for the machine /environ­ 
mental affecting factors. The variance analysis 
is first performed on the total matrix and then 
subroutined to the split matrices.
The variance analysis model is represented
as follows ;3
i = 1.2.3. 
j = 1.2.3.
(1)
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Figure 1, Pre-Validating Procedure
Table I
Candidate Critical Performance Evaluation Factors
Motivation
Personnel Qualifications
Auditory Threshhold Criticality
Personnel Adaptation
Visual Demands
Mental Demands
Access Openings
Protective Clothing
Protective Devices
Visual Presentation of Information
Warning & Signaling Devices
Mechanical Indicators
Special Systems Requirements
Human Dynamics
Crew Arrangement
Ease of Maintenance
Biological Factors
Occupational Factors
Accessibility 
Work Space
Environmental Conditions 
Work Hazards 
Equipment Hazards 
Physical Demand 
Communications; Visual Aural 
Lighting or Illumination 
Operational & Field Support 
Special Demands & Precautions 
Test Equipment & Tools 
Displays and Controls 
Anthropomorphic Requirements 
Supervision & Inspection 
Training 
Work Pressure 
Documentation Errors 
Engineering Change Errors
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IDENTIFICATION
The identification error factor appraises the probability that an error in identification 
will be committed when an object identified incorrectly and then treated as if it were the 
correct object. Consideration shall be given to evidence that suggests the frequency of 
errors of identification is much higher than any probable human error.
DEGREE FACTOR LEVEL DESCRIPTION PTS.
Little or no probability of an identification error occurring 
Inference Marks (R = . 975 ± 2. 5%)
o Read and identify simple electrical or mechanical instrumentation
o Simple leak checks
o General visual inspection
o Simple operational checks
o Identify items involving routine tasks
o Remove and replace black boxes
o Remove and replace standard piping (no complications)
20% confident that an identification error will occur at least once 
Inference Marks (R = . 90 ± 5%)
o Install complex subassemblies
o Fault checks and isolation of detailed electronic instrumentation
o Read and follow complex instructions
18
25% confident that an identification error will occur at least once 
Inference Marks (R = . 75 ± 5%)
o Highly complex instrumentation readings involving highly complex
systems 
o Highly complex troubleshooting
28
40% confident that an identification error will occur at least once 
Inference Marks (R = . 60 ± 5%)
o Consideration for redundancy or redesign of procedures required 
to maintain reliability
45
Figure 2. Factor Definition
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ACTIVITY TITLE:
TASK TITLE :
INSTALL S-IC WORK PLATFORM TO ACTIVITY CODE: 1261
65636373 PANEL SUPT. ASSEMBLY TASK CODE:
R-lnher: .975
CRITICALITY-. II
ACTIVITY LOCATION: S-IC INTERSTAGE REDUNDANCY
FACTORS
MEMORY
ATTENTION
IDENTIFICATION
INTERPRETATION
PHYSICAL DEMAND
SAFETY OF OTHERS
Xm 6.3
OPERATION OR 
PROCEDURES
WORKING 
CONDITIONS
SPECIAL DEMANDS 
& PRECAUTIONS
OPERATIONAL 
SUPPORT
COMMUNICATIONS
EQUIPMENT 
HAZARDS
WORKING SPACE
ACCESSIBILITY
Xe 78.7
SUBSTANTIATING DATA
PLATFORM SUBASSEMBLIES NOT DIFICULT TO INSTALL- 
MINOR SUBASSEMBLIES
FITTING AND ALIGNMENT NOT DIFFICULT- MINOR 
SUBASSEMBLIES
ROUTINE TASK IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
SIMPLE OPERATIONAL CHECKS 
ROUTINE READING OF BLUE PRINTS
MODERATE PHYSICAL EFFORT -REQUIRES HANDLING 
PLATFORM IN DIFFICULT WORK POSITION
HANDLING PLATFORM OVERHEAD
d- m 1.2
SIMPLE ROUTINE DUTIES ASSEMBLING PLATFORMS
POSSIBLE HYPERGOL CONTAMINATION, ENVIRONMENT 
CONTAINS POSSIBLE ELECTRIC HAZARDS
NO SPECIAL TOOLS OR TRAINING
CONSTANT MONITOR REQUIRED
TELEPHONE LINE AVAILABLE-LITTLE OR NO 
INTERFERENCE
EXERCISE CARE, HANDLING EQUIPMENT. TO PREVENT 
DAMAGE TO FLIGHT CRITICAL ITEMS AND WIRING
WORK ENVELOPE ADEQUATE
ACCESSIBILITY IS ADEQUATE
*e 26.6
DEG
2
1
1
1
2
2
PTS
8
0
7
7
8
8
TOTAL , ft 
PTS. 5B
1
3
1
2
2
3
3
3
140
95
70
65
65
85
55
55
TOTAL ,,, PTS. 635
Figure 3. Typical Rating Specification
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SATURN V MAINTAINABILITY
ACTIVITY TITLE: INSTALL S-IC WORK PLAT­ 
FORM TO 65 B36373 PANEL SUPT. ASS 'Y
TASK TITLE:
PERSONNEL REQUIRED: 2
LOCATION: S-IC INTERSTAGE
ACTIVITY CODE: 1261
TASK CODE:
TASK TIME: 15
CRITICALITY: 11
Rinh:- .975
FUNCTIONAL OR ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION
PLAN AND PERFORM ALL REQUIRED TASKS TO INSTALL THE S-IC INTERTANK 
WORK PLATFORMS. WORK IS PERFORMED PRIOR TO CRYOGENIC LOADING 
AND AFTER REMOVAL OF THE ARMING TOWER
HUMAN PERFORMANCE
1. VERIFY ALL ACCESS REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN MET
2. TRANSPORT LIGHTING EQUIPMENT AND ROLL AROUND PLATFORM 
SUBASSEM8LIES FROM STORAGE AREA ON LUT LEVEL TO WORK 
PLATFORM AT THE END OF SERVICE ARM
3. INSTALL SUPPORT ASSEMBLY 85B-36382-1 AND FASTEN INTO 
PLACE WITH TOGGLE CLAMP
4. INSTALL SUPPORT ASSEMBLY 85B-36382-2 AND FASTEN IN 
PLACE WITH TOGGLE CLAMP
5. INSTALL STRUT ASSEMBLY 85B-369H1 AND FASTEN INTO PLACE
6. INSTALL BRACE ASSEMBLY 85B-36625-I AND FASTEN INTO PLACE
7. INSTALL 85B36619- 1 PANEL SUPPORT ASSEMBLY AND FASTEN 
TO 65B36382-1
8. INSTALL 65B36373-1 PANEL ASSEMBLY POSITIONING TO 
MATCH 65B3619-1 PANEL SUPPORT ASSEMBLY
9. INSTALL 65636385-1 HANDRAIL ASSEMBLY AND LOCK TO 
65B36382-1 SUPPORT ASSEMBLY AND 65B-36619-1 PANEL 
SUPT ASSEMBLY
Figure 3A. Typical Rating Specification
277
Table II
Abstract Man/Machine Computer Matrix
1 
•*• ^ w ^" *•**• 
1
Activity
Task i
Task i~
Task i
Task i
4
Task i
Task i 6
Task i
Task i 
8
Task ig
Task i Q
'
i 
n
Man
h
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
J2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
J 3
1
2
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
J4
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
2
J 5
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
Machine /Environment
J6
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
i
J 7
2
2
3
1
2
2
2
1
1
J 8
3
2
1
3
1
2
1
3
3
J 9
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
J 10
1
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
j ll
1
1
3
1
2
2
2
1
2
J 12
1
1
3
2
2
2
3
1
1
Split Matrix
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where: Computing the CHPAE Metric
Y. . = The rating in the ith task row and the jt 
factor column.
u = General mean.
a^ = Rating effect of the i row level of the 
factor treatments.
T - = Rating effect at the j column level of the 
factor treatments.
e.. = Random rating error, ij S
The following formula is applied to the 
matrix to analyze the variance of task probability 
ratings .
(2)
The computation of the CHPAE metric is 
accomplished by statistically comparing the 
rated distributions and statistical parameters of 
the total matrix and split matrices. Representa­ 
tive confidence curves are prepositioned such that 
an ideal rating of the interface would reflect 
little or no overlap of the confidence curves and 
that when X - X =0, the interface index would 
be highly critical.
By considering the variance of the scores, 
the inherent rated reliability of the interface
P. is formulated below: inh
- K
P.
inh
(10)
• • •'•J ^ J ij
where:
S l = I (Y. - Y . . . ) 2 = Sum of the squares (3) 
ij due to the factor treat­ 
ments, (r-1) degrees of 
freedom.
where:
(u - u ) = k or 0
X = Average Environmental Rating
c*
X = Average Man Rating
V - Rating Variance - Environment
^ - X (Y. . - Y. - Y. + Y . . . ) = Sum of the (4) 
ij ^ ^ squares for total
variance.
and:
0" = Rating Variance - Man,
d = Activity Margin,
O" = Total Variance
u = ~~T = Variance distributed as F, if H is (5)
C 4. °S true.
The variance analysis related to factor 
treatments and the activity is expressed as:
£ (X - Y ...) Z /(c-l)
u = Arbitrary Ideal Population - Man,
u = Arbitrary Ideal Population - Environment
<L
The percent reliability, "R", is determined
by referring calculated P. to t-Tables.inh
(6) R = 100 - Q (t-Table) (11)
_ _ _
(Y.. - Y. - Y. + Y ...r/(r-l)(c-l)
where:
S = Z (Y.. - Y . . . ) 2 /(c-l) = Sum of squares (?) 
ij ^ of task ratings (c-1)
degrees of freedom
2 
S = Sum of total variance as in (4). (8)
3
and:
5 2 (9)
u - — = Distributed as F if H is true.
5 3
For assurance that (1) the probability of
the specific points in the distribution curve 
actually overlap each other, a test of assurance 
can. be applied to- a probability of success, "P", 
and, confidence level, MC", to yield, a statistic of 
assurance,. IT T ",.
Then, the test of assurance (T ) is as 
follows:
TA =
P., , - K inh
71/N +K2
2N-1
where;
(12)
K = from CM Square Table
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A math model of the critical index computa­ 
tion is illustrated in Figure 4. The reliability 
index is extracted from output A.
Performance Criticality Rank
The CHPAE criticality rank is obtained by 
ranking the significance level of the rated 
inherent probability P. , . - probability of 
successful human performance.
The criticality scale is as follows: 
Criticality I - Above 0. 1% level 
Criticality II - 1% to 0. 1% level 
Criticality III - 5% to 1% level 
Criticality IV - Below 5% level 
Criticality V - Below 10% level 
CHPAE Systems Approach
The computation of the systems probabili­ 
ties can be pooled and summarized up to the 
systems level. However, since the program 
carries a rated controlled judgment, the desir­ 
able confidence precision is best maintained by 
pooling up to the activity levels and posting the 
results to the systems criticality comparative 
analysis. This type of format chart is illustrated 
in Figure 5. Series, parallel, and redundant 
sub-tasks, tasks, activities, events, etc. must 
be considered in the task and activity pooling. 
Redundancy must also be considered in the 
comparative analysis.
Application to Single or Random Activity - 
General Program
An evaluation program for single or random 
activity can be accomplished by developing a 
generalized plan, including an evaluation manual 
with generalized factors which will rate most 
human activities. The general plan can have an 
open end to add or substitute one or five factors. 
In most cases, interpolation of the factors will 
suffice where the factors do not quite fit the task 
or activity.
Computer Backup
The CHPAE program has been designed to 
facilitate computer programming and computer 
support. It is highly desirable that computer 
time be requested if a large number of activities 
are to be evaluated. Computer application 
relieves the analyst of the cumbersome task of 
making statistical calculations, and provides 
backup support to non-math personnel such as 
psychologists, biologists, and human factors 
specialists.
Conclusions
The CHPAE program is a novel approach 
to rate the man/machine interface.
The program is both qualitative and 
quantitative in design and sufficiently versatile 
for application to a wide variety of human tasks 
and activities.
Once established, the plan can be applied 
with relative ease by psychologists, physiologists, 
biologists, human factors specialists, and 
reliability engineers. It provides a valuable tool 
for evaluating critical human performance, per­ 
forming human error analysis, evaluating 
system and hardware designs, performing main­ 
tainability analysis, determining training 
requirements, and evaluating human operational 
requirements. The plan is designed also to 
facilitate computer programming and calculation 
backup.
The CHPAE program has been designed to 
control and minimize the natural subjectivity 
associated with evaluation programs. The 
metric is in terms of the probable potential 
human error and the probable significance of 
the rated reliability.
Glossary
Analysis of Variance - The magnitude of 
rated or estimated factor differences and the 
extent to which they differ from the residual 
mean square as a test of hypothesis that such 
differences are compared with the 5% and 1% 
fiducial levels of the standard F distribution.
CHPAE Matrix - A grid of classified man/ 
machine critical factors.
CHPAE Metric - A matrix analysis of 
rated probability estimates and varients; one 
distribution representing man's critical rated 
factors and one distribution representing the 
rated environmental varients. The variance 
analysis of the rated factors establish within 
confidence precision, the percentage of rated 
potential error in a particular activity or task.
CHPAE Model - A statistical abstract or 
schematic representation of the man/machine 
affecting factors and/or man/machine/environ­ 
ment interface.
CHPAE Redundancy - The number of 
repeated performances required in a given 
sample in order to assure one completely 
successful performance.
Critical Factor - A performance factor 
which, if not performed in accordance to correct 
procedure or design requirements, has the
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greatest adverse effects on the total system's u Mood, A. M. Introduction to the Theory 
performance, crew safety and cost. of Statistics, 1963, McGraw-Hill, Inc.
Human/Initiated Malfunction or Human 
Error - On equipment failure or an unscheduled 
hold in which the human can be identified as the 
causitive agent in the immediate train of events 
leading to the failure.
Human Operation - A human component in 
a process which translates a system from one 
state to another.
Malfunction - A general term used to 
denote the occurence of failure of a product to 
give satisfactory performance. In this report, 
malfunctions are considered to include equip­ 
ment failures, procedural failures and 
unscheduled holds.
Man/Machine Interface - Assumed line of 
interaction between man and machine. Systems 
where man and machines are interacting 
together in a given environment to achieve given 
objectives.
Reliability - The probability of adequate 
performance of a specified function or functions 
for a specified time in a given environment.
Statistical Parameter - A representative 
statistical value or estimator.
System Representative Factor - A constant 
or variable factor which represents an affecting 
man/machine/environment characteristic of the 
system.
Task Analysis - An analytical process 
employed to determine the demands which human 
and machine components make upon each other in 
a given operational context. Task analysis 
usually involves (1) Identification of performed 
sequence of operations, (2) Identification of 
human and equipment components related to 
analyzed tasks, (3) Analysis of man/machine 
interaction, (4) Evaluation of performance time 
and, (5) Analysis of affecting factors such as 
environmental conditions, hazard to men and 
equipment, malfunctions, potential human error 
and others.
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